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Preface
The United States has the most expensive health care system in the
world, yet its system produces inferior outcomes relative to those
in other countries. Moreover, it is the only country with a high
per capita income that lacks universal health care coverage. Less
than two-thirds of workers under age 65 have health insurance,
while coverage varies greatly according to socioeconomic status.
Marshall Auerback and Senior Scholar L. Randall Wray
examine the U.S. health care reform debate and argue that the
fundamental structure of the health care system is unlikely to
change. Both the House and Senate versions of the current health
care bill entrench the centrality of private health insurance com-
panies and contain no serious proposals to limit costs. “Reform”
measures actually promote the status quo by pulling more peo-
ple into an expensive health care system that is managed and
funded by insurers. Since two-thirds of household bankruptcies
are due to health care costs, forcing people to turn over an even
larger portion of their income to insurance companies will fur-
ther erode household finances and exacerbate the problem.
Moreover, health care remains a function of employment, which
preserves a significant cost disadvantage for U.S. corporations
and is particularly unappealing during periods of double-digit
unemployment. 
The authors note that tying health insurance to employers
was a historical accident that distorts the method of grouping
individuals for the purposes of insurance. Since (private) insur-
ance companies are in the business of maximizing profits, they
attempt to reduce costs by denying coverage in consort with
increasing exclusions. Prescreening and “denial management”
costs are estimated to represent approximately 2 percent of GDP,
while administrative overhead and profits represent almost one-
third of health spending. And as health care costs have soared,
legislators have backed off from enforcing mandates or financing
new coverage for the poor. 
According to the authors, the fundamental problem facing
the U.S. health care system is the unhealthy lifestyle of many
Americans. They would prefer to see a reduced role for private
insurers and an increased role for government funding, along
with greater public discussion of environmental and lifestyle fac-
tors. Minimal competition between private insurers means that
premiums based on behavior modifications that reduce health
risk have not been adjusted downward. A campaign to promote
healthy lifestyles would do more to improve outcomes and
reduce costs than any of the proposed “health care reforms.” 
Ideally, insurance premiums should be linked to individual
risks, since 80 percent of health care costs are attributed to 20
percent of patients. Taxing current insurance holders and cut-
ting Medicare to extend insurance to the uninsured should not
be features of legislative reform. 
In the authors’ view, insurance is best suited to cover unex-
pected losses. Furthermore, social policy dictates the losses that
insurers must cover, and people need health care services on a
routine basis. Since it is in the public interest to ensure that the
entire population receives preventative and routine care, these
services should not be subject to denial of coverage by the insur-
ance companies. 
The authors point out that Medicare is not really an insur-
ance program but rather a universal-payer, pay-as-you-go sys-
tem (there is no way to stockpile medical services for future use).
An earlier version of the Senate’s proposed health care legisla-
tion featured a Medicare buy-in for people under 65—a feature
that remains doable despite today’s political constraints. This
“public option” provides more cost control (by competing with
the private insurance companies), helps to solve the problem of
denying treatment based on preexisting conditions, expands the
risk pool of patients, and enhances the global competitiveness 
of U.S. corporations. Thus, a Medicare buy-in would bring the
U.S. health care system closer to the “ideal” low-cost, universal
(single-payer) insurance plan.
As always, I welcome your comments.
Dimitri B. Papadimitriou, President
March 2010Public Policy Brief, No. 110 4
Toward True Health Care Reform
This brief will examine the health care reform debate in the
United States. We will make four points. First, the proposed leg-
islation (both the House and Senate versions) will do little to
improve provision of health care to currently underserved pop-
ulations, and hence will have little impact on outcomes. Second,
using insurance as the primary means of providing finance 
of health care delivery is costly — indeed, it is the main problem
facing the nation. Third, in any event, relating coverage to
employment is no longer viable. Fourth, the proposed reforms,
rather than constraining exploding costs, will likely contribute
to them.
The U.S. Health Care System
Funding of our current health care system, like our retirement
system, rests on a three-legged stool. The first leg is private insur-
ance, almost all of which is provided through employment. The
second leg is provided by the individuals receiving care, through
out-of-pocket expenses, including copayments and paying for
uncovered treatment or medicines. Finally, there is the govern-
ment, which picks up the tab through a variety of programs at all
levels of government. The biggest of these are Medicaid and
Medicare. 
As reported by Stephanie A. Kelton (2007), about 63 per-
cent of the nonelderly population (those under age 65, who are
not eligible for Medicare) rely on employer-provided insurance,
while government pays for insurance for about 18 percent of the
population and over 17 percent are uninsured. Also as reported
by Kelton, there are several different types of plans offered by
employers. By far the most important are HMOs and PPOs,
which together provide 85 percent of employer-sponsored plans.
In 2000, approximately 67 percent of nonaged workers
(again, excluding those over age 65, most of whom qualify for
Medicare) had insurance, but this declined to less than 63 per-
cent by 2005. Coverage varies greatly by socioeconomic status:
in 2005 70 percent of whites had coverage, compared to only 50
percent of black workers and 41 percent of Hispanic workers
(Kelton 2007). Fewer than half the workers in very small firms
(fewer than 10 workers) were covered, while almost 80 percent of
workers in the biggest firms (over 1,000 employees) had cover-
age. And less than one-third of workers who had dropped out of
high school had coverage, while about 80 percent of those who
had attended college received coverage. 
Of course, the quantity and quality of coverage vary greatly,
with some workers receiving what have been labeled “Cadillac”
plans and others receiving only “catastrophic” coverage. Out-of-
pocket expenses also vary widely by plan, as does the freedom to
choose health care provision. Health care insurance is not the
same as health care provision—there can be many a slip between
cup and lip: insurance may not cover needed care, and insurance
coverage does not guarantee access to needed care.
Relatively few individuals purchase individual health insur-
ance plans, and those who do find it expensive. In 2007 about
14.5 million individuals (5 percent of the population) purchased
insurance (Schiff 2009). Many were self-employed or worked in
small companies; about a third were unemployed. Half were
between the ages of 50 and 64. A survey found that about half of
those who tried to purchase an individual plan found it difficult
or impossible to buy insurance (ibid.). Further, premiums and
deductibles are higher and coverage is less comprehensive for
individual plans than for employer-provided coverage. Almost
half of the individuals who acquired insurance paid at least
$6,000 a year for coverage, and a fifth paid at least $8,000. The
reform proposals would require more individuals to purchase
insurance, albeit with subsidies.
It is no secret that the United States “enjoys” the most expen-
sive health care system in the world—both absolutely and rela-
tive to GDP. In 2009 health care spending reached 17.4 percent
of GDP, up from 16.2 percent in 2008 (Levey 2010). In 1960
health care consumed just 5 percent of GDP; by 2000, that figure
had risen to 14 percent. Based on current projections, health care
spending would reach one-fifth of GDP by 2020. Also based on
current projections, the government’s share of health care spend-
ing will finally overtake the total spending by the other two “legs”
(employers and individuals) by 2011 or 2012 (ibid.). In 1960 gov-
ernment accounted for just a quarter of total health care spend-
ing. Note that these projections are made exclusive of any
possible health care “reform”—which would likely increase the
government’s share.
At the same time, in many respects the health outcomes fall
short of those that are apparently delivered by much cheaper sys-
tems in both highly developed and less developed nations. Below
we will explore some reasons for this. Here we only address the
costs, and the composition of spending in comparison with otherLevy Economics Institute of Bard College 5
nations. First, it is important to note how unusual the United
States is—no other comparable nation (in terms of high per
capita income) lacks universal health care coverage, and many
nations that are much poorer provide universal access. And in
most of the nations that are similar in other respects to the
United States, government plays a much bigger role in health care
delivery and in financing the system. 
As reported by the New America Foundation (NAF; Damme
2009), the divergence of costs is growing rapidly. In 1980 the
United States’ per capita costs were approximately double those
of the United Kingdom, which had the lowest cost of the largest
OECD nations; by 2008, the United States’ costs were triple those
of the lowest-cost nation, Japan (Figure 1). As a percent of GDP,
the United States devotes almost twice as much to health care as
the average OECD nation (Figure 2).
The NAF study shows that even after accounting for the pos-
itive correlation between spending on health care and GDP (rich
nations can afford to spend more, and do), the United States
spends far more than would be expected. Yet, by several meas-
ures, U.S. outcomes are actually worse. For example, the United
States has lower life expectancy and higher infant mortality than
any other nation that has even remotely similar living standards,
in spite of the much higher per capita expenditure on health care.
Adult mortality rates in the United States are almost double those
of Italy, Australia, Sweden, Japan, and other relatively wealthy
Figure 1 Health Care Expenditures per Capita, 1980–2007 
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nations (Figure 3). Finally, infant mortality rates are far higher
than those in comparable nations—similar to those in the Slovak
Republic and double the rates in high-income nations (Figure 4).
To some extent, the higher costs and poorer outcomes could
have something to do with the way we finance our care—
through insurance—and with the choices we make over the
kinds of care provided. The United States spends a lot more on
curative-rehabilitative services, more on administration and
insurance, and more on medical goods than the other nations
included in the study (Figure 5).  The fastest-growing part of U.S.
health care spending is outpatient care (included in the curative-
rehabilitative category). The NAF study finds that the United
States spends twice as much as would be expected on outpatient
care, given per capita GDP, which now amounts to 40 percent of
total health care spending. As we discuss below, this is related to a
virtual explosion of costs in the caring for chronic health problems.
The study’s results are somewhat surprising because one
would have expected that our higher costs would have more to
Figure 4 Infant Mortality Rate* per 1,000 Live Births, 2006  
*Probability of dying by age five 























































































































































































































































































Figure 3 Adult Mortality Rate* per 1,000 Population, 2006  
*Probability of dying between 15 and 60 years of age
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do with administrative expenses of our more complex approach
to health care—with a large number of insurers and lots of
paperwork. However, even if we were able to reduce those costs
toward OECD averages, the United States would still have much
higher per capita expenditures. As we will argue, expanding
insurance to the currently uncovered population is not likely to
reduce the spending gap between the United States and our com-
parator nations. Some have argued that expanding coverage
would lower emergency room treatment. While probably true,
with outpatient care at 40 percent of the health care budget it is
difficult to believe that more insurance will help reduce U.S. costs
significantly.
Overview of the Health Care Proposals
It now appears that President Obama’s hope for a grand, sweep-
ing health care reform bill is unlikely to pass, given the unex-
pected election to the Senate of Republican Scott Brown. In
response, there has been some discussion of a more incremental
approach. But the whole episode has demonstrated one key fact:
the fundamental structure of our health care system is unlikely
to change significantly, no matter what “reforms” are introduced,
and however incrementally. Virtually all of the proposals put
forth retain a dominant role for private health insurance com-
panies: it is the Massachusetts model writ on a national scale. 
Does the recent Massachusetts special election result have
any implications in this regard? The loss of the Democrats’ super-
majority is being used by many to call for a pause in reform. Yet
Senate Democrats in particular should not obsess about the so-
called supermajority number—60—required to end filibusters in
the upper chamber of Congress. A 59–41 majority in the Senate
still gives the Democrats ample opportunities to legislate signifi-
cant improvements in our health care system, even if by means of
a more piecemeal and incremental approach. Substantial reforms
can, for example, be done via Senate reconciliation (a parliamen-
tary maneuver that allows legislation in the upper chamber to
pass with a simple majority vote). And it’s fundamentally more
democratic: two or three senators should not be able to hold an
entire piece of legislation hostage to their own narrow political
interests, as Senators Joseph Lieberman and Ben Nelson, among
others, were able to do with the previous reform bill.
In response to the “incrementalists,” Paul Krugman (2010)
has argued that it is difficult to achieve significant health care
reform via reconciliation, as this Senate procedure is basically
limited to matters of taxing and spending, and therefore cannot
be used to enact many important aspects of health care reform
(such as the ban on preexisting conditions).What Krugman fails
to recognize is that there exist major loopholes in the insurance
“reforms” on exclusion for preexisting conditions and no can-
cellations on the grounds of sickness. The hard-fought “reforms,”
in other words, are more apparent than real. Both the final Senate
and House versions of the reform bill contain a significant loop-
hole, whereby “intentional misrepresentation” or fraud can be
used by insurance companies as a means of denying coverage on
the basis of a preexisting condition. Not telling the insurer of a
preexisting condition—even one the consumer does not know
about—constitutes “fraud.” Both fraud and “intentional misrep-
resentation” are the main pretexts that insurers use today to deny
coverage on the basis of preexisting conditions.  
Figure 5 Composition of Health Spending per Capita, 2007 



















Note: Totals for Canada, France, and Germany do not include capital formation 
expenditures; Japan data is as of 2006. 
Sources: OECD Stat Extracts for Canada, France, and Germany; Damme 2009 for 















Health Administration and Health Insurance 
Prevention and Public Health Services
Medical Goods Dispensed to Outpatients
Ancillary Services
Long-term Nursing Care 
Curative and Rehabilitative Care   
   Public Policy Brief, No. 110 8
Other major loopholes, as noted by John Nichols (2009) of
The Nation include: 
Provisions permitting insurers and companies to more
than double charges to employees who fail “wellness”
programs because they have diabetes, high blood pres-
sure, high cholesterol readings, or other medical con-
ditions. 
Insurers are permitted to sell policies “across state
lines,” exempting patient protections passed in other
states. Insurers will thus set up in the least regulated
states in a race to the bottom threatening public pro-
tections won by consumers in various states.
The RN “superunion” National Nurses United, an organization
with 150,000 members, opposed the Senate version of the health
care bill for these very reasons (ibid.).
Loopholes aside, Krugman also embraces the principle flaw
inherent in the whole health care reform effort. Both the House
and Senate versions of the bill entrench the centrality of private
health insurance companies. But as we seek to illustrate, insuring
health care is not a service that should be provided by private
companies.
Contrary to what the president suggested in the aftermath
of the Massachusetts senate by-election, bad salesmanship was
not the main problem here. There were lots of unattractive sub-
stantive elements in the bill, such as reductions in spending on
Medicare in order to “pay” for the bill’s “reforms,” misconceived
taxes on “Cadillac plans” as a means of “reducing” health care
costs and “funding” reform, and a focus on costly end-of-life care
(requiring “guidance” from an “independent group” outside of
“normal political channels”). All of this occurred against the
backdrop of vague, incomprehensible talk by the president and
his budget director, Peter Orszag, about ”game changers” and
“curve-benders,” and arguments that “we’re going to have to
change how doctors think about health care and how patients
think about health care” (Obama 2009). These are the sorts of
things that can be happily debated in a health care symposium
but will hardly ease the fears of the average voter, whose main
concerns are “Will I get coverage?” and “How much will it cost
me personally?”
Remember the Alternative Minimum Tax (AMT) that was
introduced almost as a footnote to President Reagan’s tax reform
bill of 1986? At the time, it seemed like a relatively small item;
since the threshold for the AMT was set at a reasonably high level,
it didn’t affect a lot of people initially. But as time went on and
incomes rose, more and more of the middle class got trapped by
it. The same thing almost certainly would have occurred in
regard to the so-called “Cadillac tax” proposal, a tax on high-cost
health care premiums in excess of $8,900 for single plans or
$24,000 for family plans per annum (Mascaro 2010). Given that
neither the House nor the Senate version of the bill contained
any serious proposals for cost containment, health insurance pre-
miums probably would have continued to skyrocket, which
would virtually guarantee that an increasing number of health
insurance customers would be hit by the tax as time went on. It
is hard to see how pricing disclosure via national exchanges
would significantly change that element, especially given the fact
that the health insurance industry is an oligopoly dominated by
a limited number of private companies, with no competition
from the now-dead public option. 
True, in the absence of any kind of health care reform, ris-
ing health insurance costs are still likely to remain an everyday
reality. But that would be in a situation without the punitive 
taxation provisions contained in the current bill, which would
simply add to the problems of the highly stressed, debt-laden
American consumer.
It is important to note that none of the health care propos-
als ventured thus far remove the oligopoly structure of an inef-
ficient, dysfunctional, fragmented, multipayer system dominated
by five or six private health insurance plans (“too big to fail”
insurance companies like AIG). Nearly all retain the structure of
employer-based health insurance, preserving a significant cost
disadvantage for U.S. corporations, which are forced to incor-
porate health care as a marginal cost of production. This means
that not only will portability become virtually impossible but
also that health care will remain a function of employment—
hardly an appealing prospect at a time of double-digit (and still
rising) unemployment. 
As Julius Richmond and Rashi Fein describe in The Health
Care Mess (2005), employer-based health insurance is largely a
product of historical accident rather than conscious policy on
the part of either employers or the government. It arose out of
the labor shortages created during World War II, which, in the
absence of controls, would have left employers in a position to bid
aggressively against one another in order to attract workers. The
government introduced controls that prevented a wage spiral but
did not include health care benefits, a convenient loopholeLevy Economics Institute of Bard College 9
exploited by employers as a means of competing for workers.
Medical benefits proved to be an attractive form of compensa-
tion for workers to the extent that they protected them from risk;
too, employers liked the fact that the benefits were not deemed
to be part of workers’ taxable income, thereby helping to mod-
erate wage demands (Krugman and Wells 2006). 
The intrinsic costs of providing insurance are relatively low,
with one proviso: the entire population be offered insurance in
the absence of screening, with the annual premium struck 
at a level that covers the average person’s health care expenses
and the insurance company’s administrative costs (ibid.).
Unfortunately, that is not what we have: many insurers (with a
handful that dominate), many different kinds of plans, and many
uncovered people. Hence, healthy people with low medical bills
would find little incentive to join such a system, whereas
unhealthy people would find the proposals to be very attractive.
Insurers likewise prefer to select for healthy people, and to offer
lower premiums to attract them. Premiums are thus higher for
the unhealthy, who are more likely to go without coverage as a
result. Uncovered individuals show up in emergency rooms, with
the attendant high costs passed along to premium payers, hospi-
tal owners, and governments.
Harvard medical economists David Himmelstein and Steffie
Woolhandler (2007) estimate the costs of prescreening and
denial management to be approximately $350 billion a year—
just under 2 percent of GDP. (Woolhandler, in a 2007 interview,
estimated that about 31 percent of health care spending in
America goes to administrative overhead and profit.) They also
point out that the common “reform” to mitigate this impact—
employer mandates that seek to pool the risks more broadly and,
in theory, reduce overall health insurance costs—has been sin-
gularly ineffective: “The ‘mandate model’ for reform rests on
impeccable political logic: avoid challenging insurance firms’
stranglehold on health care. But it is economic nonsense. The
reliance on private insurers makes universal coverage unafford-
able” (ibid.).
To some extent, the move at the state level toward “univer-
sal health care” (in reality, mandated private health insurance)
has increased coverage, notably in Massachusetts, where, accord-
ing to state estimates, only 2.6 percent of residents remain unin-
sured. A report by John Holahan and Linda Blumberg (2009)
indicates that the Massachusetts reform “has had positive
impacts on insurance coverage and access to medical care. The
number of uninsured has fallen by more than half—with no evi-
dence that subsidized coverage has ‘crowded out’ private insur-
ance. Unmet needs for a range of medical services have dropped,
as have financial burdens associated with health care.” But the
program is not without its costs. The “reforms” introduced to
great fanfare in Massachusetts mandate that people who do not
want to buy insurance must buy it, and require insurers who do
not want to extend insurance to them to provide it. This has led
to frustration that might have been reflected in the recent elec-
toral outcome in that state.
As the long-run costs of health care have soared, legislators
have backed off from enforcing the mandates or from financing
new coverage for the poor. Many people remain uninsured
because they cannot afford the increasingly high costs of private
health insurance. And forcing more people into the system does
not address the cost issue:
The fundamental assumption is that the uninsured
have enough money to buy insurance policies, that they
can buy their way out of the predicament. If they had
the money, they’d already have insurance! They don’t
have money in the first place. Someone my age, in their
50s, and making over $29,400 a year, would get no sub-
sidy. The cost of that premium would be $4,200 a year,
but along with that there’s a $2,000 deductible before
any coverage begins, co-pays, and co-insurance after
that first $2,000. 
That kind of coverage is worthless to a low-income
person. They don’t have money for the premium, and
they can’t pay the $2,000 out of pocket. I don’t call that
insurance, I call it a hoax. You’re not going to be able to
cover everyone with those kinds of premiums. And
expansion of Medicaid won’t get us to universal cover-
age, either. We’ve had 10-plus years of experience with
that.(Woolhandler 2007) 
Deregulation and competition fail when consumers have no
real choice, because the situation invariably leads to an abuse of
pricing power. Rent-seeking monopolization is an inevitable 
outcome of any activity that becomes financialized. In
Massachusetts, high costs have forced the state to trim benefits
for legal immigrants and prompted one safety-net hospital to
sue over a $38 million shortfall. Strapped for cash, the state
recently eliminated dental, hospice, and skilled nursing care for
30,000 legal immigrants. Cigarette taxes were raised to help payPublic Policy Brief, No. 110 10
for the program. Coverage for workers in small businesses has
lagged. And private health insurance premiums are expected to
increase by about 10 percent next year, according to several esti-
mates (see Holahan and Blumberg 2009). Minimal competition
amongst the private insurers means that they have not reduced
the premiums for those whose behavior modification has
reduced risk.
Why Health Care Reform Proposals Will Not Reduce
Costs or Improve Outcomes
Too little exercise, too much smoking, and too much food—
especially too much bad food—together account for a large part
of the United States’ comparatively high health care costs and
inferior outcomes. As Michael Pollan (2008) argues, unless we
address these problems, we will not significantly improve our
health no matter what we do with health care. According to
Pollan, the cost to society of the American addiction to “fast
food” is already $250 billion per year in diet-related health care
costs. One-third of Americans born in 2000 will develop diabetes
in their lifetime; on average, diabetes subtracts 12 years from life
expectancy, and raises annual medical costs from $2,500, for a
person without diabetes, to $13,000. This in part explains the
rapid growth in outpatient costs, which as noted above are very
much higher than those of nations with comparable per capita
income and wealth. A recent study finds that the medical costs
related to obesity could have been as high as $147 billion in 2008,
amounting to 10 percent of all medical spending (Finkelstein et
al. 2009). Annual medical costs are $1,400 higher for an obese
person than for a person of normal weight. Approximately two-
thirds of adult Americans are overweight, and one-third are
obese. Obesity and diabetes are correlated (being overweight is
the biggest risk factor for developing diabetes), and obese dia-
betics are the most difficult to treat. Total spending on diabetes
treatment is estimated at $190 billion a year.
There are other factors that increase health care costs and
worsen outcomes. Smoking causes more than 400,000 deaths
yearly. Simply banning smoking from public places throughout
our country could reduce this annual toll by 150,000 (Winslow
2009). We incarcerate a far higher percentage of our population
than any other developed society on earth, and health care costs
in prisons are exploding—for the obvious reason that prisons
are not healthy environments. Our relatively high poverty rates,
combined with a high percentage of the population that is left
outside the labor market (especially young adult males without
a high school degree), contribute to very poor health outcomes. 
For these reasons, we believe that more health insurance
coverage would no more resolve our health care problems than
would provision of car insurance to chronic drunk drivers solve
our DUI problem. Instead, a campaign to increase exercise,
reduce smoking, and otherwise promote healthy lifestyles would
almost certainly do more to improve outcomes—and reduce
costs—than do the so-called “health care reforms” now being
considered in Washington. 
While we are at it, we can reintroduce Americans to food. We
don’t mean the corporate offerings that Pollan calls “food-like
substances”—products derived from plants and animals but gen-
erated by breaking down the original foods into their most basic
molecules and then reconstituting them in a manner that can be
more profitably marketed. What we mean is real food, produced
by farmers and consumed after as little processing as possible.
Preferably, it will be local, and will consist mostly of vegetables,
grains, and fruits. And let us provide decent jobs to anyone ready
to work, as an alternative to having their labor skills eroded
through the drudgery of long-term unemployment . Ban smok-
ing from all public places and regulate tobacco like the highly
addictive and dangerous drug that it is. Together, these policies
will do far more to improve American health and to reduce health
care costs than anything that the “reformers” are proposing.
To conclude this part of the analysis: the benefits of extend-
ing health insurance coverage are almost certainly overstated and
are not likely to make a major dent in our two comparative gaps.
We spend far more than any otherwise similar nation but do not
obtain better outcomes, and in certain important areas we actu-
ally get worse results. Nations that adopt diets closer to ours
begin to suffer similar afflictions: obesity, diabetes, heart disease,
hypertension, diverticulitis, malformed dental arches and tooth
decay, varicose veins, ulcers, hemorrhoids, and cancer (Pollan
2008, 91). In other words, the differentials in outcomes and costs
probably have more to do with “lifestyle choices,” and the gaps
might be lowered not by reducing U.S. spending and improving
outcomes, but by rising spending and worsening outcomes
among our comparator nations if and when they adopt the
American lifestyle. We sincerely hope this will not be the case.
Even universal health insurance is not going to lower the costs
of chronic afflictions that are largely due to the fact that we eat too
much of the wrong kinds of food and get too little exercise. It
makes more sense to attack the problem directly by increasingLevy Economics Institute of Bard College 11
exercise, reducing caloric intake, and minimizing consumption
of corporate “food-like” substances that make us sick than to
provide insurance so that those who suffer the consequences of
an unhealthy lifestyle can afford costly care. Finally, the “reforms”
mostly propose to simply do more of what we are already
doing—that is, to get more people into an expensive health care
system managed and funded by insurers. Insurers, in turn, will
do what they can to shift costs by excluding individuals from cov-
erage, restricting the coverage of those included, denying pay-
ment for care, and requiring copayments. It strains credulity to
believe that this will result in a cheaper health care system.
Is Insurance a Reasonable Way to Provide 
Health Care?
Americans rely on insurance—both private and public—to pay
for most of the costs of health care. So let us ask a more funda-
mental question: is this a reasonable way for society to fund
health care expenses?
We contend that health care is not a service that should be
funded by insurance companies. An individual should insure
against expensive and undesirable calamities: tornadoes, fires,
auto accidents. These need to be insurable risks, or insurance will
not be made available. This means the events need to be reason-
ably random and relatively rare, with calculable probabilities that
do not change much over time. As discussed in Auerback and
Wray 2009, we need to make sure that the existence of insurance
does not increase the probability of insured losses. This is why we
are not allowed to insure our neighbor’s house. Insurance works
by using the premiums paid in by all of the insured to cover the
losses that infrequently visit a small subset of them. Of course,
insurance always turns out to be a bad deal for almost all of the
insured—the return is hugely negative because most of the
insured never collect benefits. The insurance company’s operat-
ing costs and profit margins are more or less equal to the net
losses suffered by its policyholders.
Ideally, insurance premiums ought to be linked to individ-
ual risks; if this actually changed behavior so that risk fell, so
much the better. That would reduce the costs to those policy-
holders who do not experience insured events, and would also
increase the insurance companies’ profitability. Competition
among insurers would then reduce the premiums for those
whose behavior modifications had reduced risks.
In practice, people are put into classes—say, “over age 55
with no accidents or moving violations” in the case of auto insur-
ance. Some people are uninsurable—the attendant risks are too
high. For example, someone who repeatedly wrecks cars while
driving drunk will not be able to purchase insurance. The gov-
ernment might help out by taking away the driver’s license, in
which case the insurer could not sell insurance even if it were
willing to take on the risk. Further, one cannot insure a burning
house against fire because it is, well, already on fire. And even if
insurance had already been purchased, the insurer could deny a
claim if it determined that the policyholder was at fault. 
The insured try to get into the low-risk, low-premium
classes; the insurers try to sort people by risk and to narrow risk
classes. To be sure, insurers do not want to avoid all risks—given
a risk/return trade-off, higher-risk individuals will be charged
higher premiums. Problems for the insurer arise if high-risk indi-
viduals are placed in low-risk classes and thus enjoy inappropri-
ately low premiums. The problem for many individuals is that
appropriately priced premiums will be unaffordable. At the
extreme, if the probability of an insurable event approaches cer-
tainty, the premium that must be charged equals the expected
loss, plus the insurance company’s operating costs and profits. 
However, it is likely that high-risk individuals would refuse
insurance long before premiums reached that level, since they
will be better off paying out of pocket. With costs skewed toward
the less healthy part of the population that bought this insur-
ance, the insurance company would invariably seek to mitigate
this impact on cost through a process of prescreening to identify
those likely to require expensive treatment, and either rejecting
their applications or charging significantly higher premiums to
compensate. Again, this tends to guarantee that the uninsured
pool is the most at risk. In any event, once an insurance policy is
written, the insurer does its best to deny claims. It will look at
the fine print and try to find exclusions and uncover preexisting
conditions (say, faulty wiring) that would invalidate the claim.
All of this is good business practice. However, regulators are
needed to protect the insured from overly aggressive denials of
claims, a responsibility largely of state government since most
types of insurance are regulated at the state level.
Let us examine the goal of universal health insurance from
this perspective. It should now be obvious that using health “insur-
ance” as the primary payment mechanism for health care is terri-
bly inappropriate. From the day of our birth, each of us is a little
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genetic predispositions to disease or, perhaps, risky behavior.
Many of these conditions will only be discovered much later,
probably in a doctor’s office. The health insurer will likely remain
in the dark until a bill is submitted for payment. It then must
seek a way to deny the claim. The insurer will check the fine print
and patient records for exclusions and preexisting conditions.
Often, insurers automatically issue a denial, forcing patients to
file an appeal. According to a recent study of claim denial by
California’s six largest HMOs, 21 percent of all claims submit-
ted in the first half of 2009 were rejected (Ivory 2009). Of course,
not all denials stand up—but appeals burden the insured and
their care givers with mountains of paperwork. From the per-
spective of the insurer, this is just good business practice—
exactly what one would expect from an insurance company, since
those whose claims are denied must weigh the costs and benefits
of trying to reverse the insurer’s decision. Meanwhile, health care
providers are stuck with unpaid bills and must decide whether to
pursue collection.
From an efficiency standpoint, it would be best to match
individual premiums to risk, but people are usually placed into
groups, often (for the historical reasons discussed above) into
employee groups. Insurers prefer youngish, urban, well-educated
professionals—those with good habits and enough income to
join an expensive gym with personal trainers and to consume a
diet full of natural foods. The insurer wants to charge even these
healthy people premiums that are higher than what the risks
would justify, and to exclude from coverage the most expensive
procedures. But their ability to do so will depend on their com-
petitors, who will want to “skim the cream” by coopting the
healthiest individuals. 
Many individuals are not really insurable, a result of pre-
existing conditions or risky behavior. However, many of these
will be covered by negotiated group insurance due to their
employment status. The idea is that the risks are spread, and the
healthier members of the group will subsidize the least healthy.
This allows the insurer to escape the abnormally high risks of pro-
viding coverage to high-risk individuals. It is, of course, a bum
deal for the healthy employees. To keep the premiums for the
group down, it is critical to prevent the healthy employees from
jumping to lower-risk pools. This probably explains at least part
of Congress’s reluctance to allow real competition in the provision
of insurance: it could set off an oligopolistic premium-cutting
war to recruit the healthiest beneficiaries, leaving pools of high-
cost, high-premium individuals that no plan wants to cover.
This is not the place for a detailed examination of the wis-
dom of tying health insurance to one’s employer. It is very diffi-
cult to believe that any justification can be made for it, so no one
really tries to justify it (Kelton 2007; Semenova and Kelton 2008).
It is simply accepted as a historical accident. It adds to the mar-
ginal cost of producing output, since employers usually pick up
a share of the premiums. It depresses the number of employees
while forcing more overtime (since health care costs are fixed per
employee, not based on hours worked) as well as more part-time
work (since insurance coverage usually requires a minimum
number of hours worked). And it burdens “legacy firms” that
offer lifetime work as well as health care for retirees. Finally, and
fairly obviously, it leaves huge segments of the population uncov-
ered because they are either unemployed, self-employed, or work
in small firms that don’t offer an insurance plan. In short, one
probably could not design a worse way of grouping individuals
for the purposes of insurance provision. Would anyone reason-
ably propose that the primary means of delivering drivers to auto
insurers or homeowners to home insurers would be through
their employers? Or that auto and house insurance premiums
ought to be set by the insurable loss experience of one’s cowork-
ers? That is too ridiculous to contemplate—and so no one
does—but it is what we do with regard to health insurance. 
The only other major consumer expenditure that we tie to
the place of employment is pensions. Pensions have their own
disaster unfolding, as legacy firms convert defined-benefit plans
to defined contributions, as the government’s guarantor (the
Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation) moves toward insol-
vency and financialized pensions, caught in the global crisis, lose
funds to the extent that their solvency is called into question. Two
legs of the retirement stool (pensions and private savings) have
already been knocked out from under households—only Social
Security remains on secure footing. There are lessons to be
learned from this experience that could be applied to the health
care debates (see Nersisyan and Wray 2010).
Insuring a person with diabetes against the risk of developing
diabetes is like insuring a burning house. An individual with dia-
betes does not need insurance. He needs quality health care, and
he needs to follow good advice in order to increase his quality of
life while reducing health care costs. Accompanying this health
care with an insurance premium is not likely to have much effect
on the health care outcome, because it probably won’t change the
insured’s behavior beyond what could be accomplished through
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with diabetes is only likely to postpone diagnosis among those
whose condition has not yet been identified. Allowing diabetics
into an insured pool increases costs for the pool’s other mem-
bers, so both they and the insurer have an interest in keeping
high-risk individuals out of the pool. Adding individuals with
diabetes to a pool increases the incentive for healthy members to
defect. If we add to that higher premiums for those with diabetes,
we are likely to increase total health care costs, since more indi-
viduals will go without coverage, opting instead for emergency-
room care.
We are not picking on people with diabetes of course. We
are just making a general point that the majority of the mem-
bers of most employee groups have reason to fear the addition of
high-cost individuals to their insurance pool. Experience shows
that health care costs follow an 80/20 pattern: 80 percent of
health care costs are incurred by 20 percent of patients
(Woolhandler 2007). If only a fraction of those high-cost indi-
viduals could be excluded, costs to the insurer as well as to the
insured in the pool could be cut dramatically. 
We have nearly 50 million individuals without health insur-
ance, and the number grows every day. The health “reform” pro-
posals seek to insure many or most of these people—mostly by
forcing them to buy insurance. All of them have preexisting con-
ditions (we all do), many of which are precisely of the type that, if
known, would make them uninsurable. While it is likely that only
a fraction of those currently uninsured have been explicitly
excluded from insurance coverage because of a preexisting condi-
tion (many more are excluded because they cannot afford the pre-
miums), every one of them actually has numerous preexisting
conditions. Yet one of the main goals of “reform” is to make it more
difficult for insurers to exclude them.
So here is what the outcome of the current proposals could
look like. Individuals will be forced to buy insurance against their
will, often with premiums set unaffordably high. Government
will provide a subsidy to insurance companies so that coverage
(of a sort) can be provided to all. Insurance companies will
impose high copayments as well as deductibles that the insured
cannot possibly afford. In this way, they will minimize claims and
the routine use of health care services by the nominally insured.
When disaster strikes—putting a poorly covered individual into
that 80/20 “high-cost patient” bracket—the insurer will find a
way to dismiss the claim. The “insured” individual will then be
faced with bills for uncovered costs that only bankruptcy can
address.
Worse than that, as we noted above, the administration pro-
poses taxing Cadillac plans—pushing costs onto those who
already have insurance—and reducing Medicare expenditures
to help “pay for” extended coverage. To try to keep plans below
the “Cadillac” threshold, the quality of insurance could be
reduced: less coverage, more exclusions, and higher out-of-
pocket expenses. It turns out that the “tea partiers” were correct
in their arguments that those who already had insurance would
get taxed, and that Medicare would be cut, in order to extend
insurance to the currently uninsured. This was something that
was denied by the administration and by Congressional
Democrats, but it is featured in the reform legislation. No won-
der the voters of Massachusetts revolted and handed Ted
Kennedy’s seat over to the Republicans. This electoral outcome
could be repeated all over the country as voter furor spreads. 
At the same time, the health care reforms will add to the
economic pressures on householders, who are already defaulting
on debts and losing their homes. The higher health care costs
that “reform” will impose on Americans will only increase their
financial problems. This is not far-fetched. Currently, two-thirds
of household bankruptcies are due to health care costs
(Woolhandler 2007). Surprisingly, most of those who have been
forced into bankruptcy had health insurance but either lost it
after treatment began or simply could not afford the out-of-
pocket expenses that the insurer refused to cover. In 2007 an
individual in her fifties would have paid an insurance premium
of $4,200 per year, with a $2,000 deductible (ibid.). Many of
those currently without insurance would be unable to meet a
deductible of this size, meaning that their “insurance” would not
provide coverage even for routine care. Only an emergency or
the development of a chronic condition would drive such a
patient into the health care system; with exclusions and limita-
tions on coverage, the patient could find that, even after meeting
the deductible and copayments, bankruptcy would be the only
way to deal with all of the uncovered expenses. Of course, that
leaves care providers with the bill—which is more or less what is
happening now without a universal insurance mandate.
By taxing Cadillac plans, the reforms will push more cur-
rently insured workers into precarious positions. Further, the
costs of the reforms will be borne by taxpayers before the bene-
fits accrue to those who will eventually be insured, because there
is a delay in extending the coverage in order to build up a reserve
or “sinking” fund—the exact method used to phase in Social
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was postponed, this reduced the fiscal stimulus that the New Deal
was able to provide, throwing the U.S. economy back into
depression in 1937. Will it be déjà vu all over again as the new
health care taxes begin, before the uninsured get coverage? 
In our view, insurance is a particularly bad way to cover the
majority cost of health care. Insurance is best suited to covering
unexpected losses that result from acts of God, accidents, and
other unavoidable calamities. But except in the case of teenagers
and young adult males, accidents are not a major source of health
care costs. In other words, the costs to the insurer are not the
equivalent of those caused by a tornado that randomly sets its
sights on a trailer park. Rather, the costs of treating chronic ill-
nesses, many of which are severe and often lead to death, are
more significant. Insuring a patient with a chronic and ultimately
fatal illness would be like insuring a house that is slowly but cer-
tainly sliding down a cliff into the sea. Neither of these is really
an insurable risk; rather, each represents a certain cost with an
actuarially sound premium that must exceed the loss (to cover
the insurer’s operating costs and profit margin). So if the policy
were appropriately priced, no one would have an economic
incentive to purchase it.
Another significant health care cost results from provision
of what could be seen as public health services—vaccinations,
mother and infant care, and so on. And a large part of that has
nothing to do with calamity but rather with normal life
processes: pregnancy, birth, well-child care, school physicals, and
certification of death. Treating a pregnancy as an insurable loss
seems silly—even if it is unplanned. We should not be financing
the health care costs associated with pregnancy and birth in the
same way that we finance the costs of repairing an auto after a
wreck—that is, through an insurance claim. Many of these
expenditures have “public good” aspects; while there are private
benefits, if the health care cannot be covered through private
insurance or out of pocket, the consequences can lead to huge
social costs. For this reason, it does not make sense to try to fund
all the private benefits of such care by charging the individuals
who may—or may not—be able and willing to pay for them. Nor
does it make sense to raise employee premiums in order to cover
expected pregnancies as more young women join a firm.
There are additional ways in which health care is not simi-
lar to protecting a homeowner against losses due to natural dis-
asters. The risks to the health insurer are greatly affected by the
behavior of the covered individuals, as well as by social policy.
For example, smoking trends have a huge impact on insurer
costs. Discovering cures and new treatments to diseases can
greatly increase, or reduce, costs. To a large extent, this is outside
the control of the insurer or the insured. If a new treatment
becomes standard care, there will be pressures on insurers to
cover it—even if it is extraordinarily expensive. Death might be
the most cost-effective way to deal with certain cancers, but stan-
dard practice does not present that as a viable treatment—nor
would public policy want it to do so. In other words, social pol-
icy dictates to a large degree the losses that insurers must (or can)
cover. Neither standard practice nor acts of Congress are equiv-
alent in their origins to acts of God—although their impacts on
insurers are similar.
We currently pay most health care expenses through health
insurance, both public and private. But people need health care
services on a routine basis—and not simply for unexpected
calamities. We have become so accustomed to health insurance
that we cannot understand how strange it is to finance health
care services in this manner. Our automobiles need routine
maintenance, including oil changes. Imagine if we expected our
auto insurer to cover such expected costs. We are all, of course,
familiar with various “extended warranty” plans sold on practi-
cally all consumer items—from toasters to flat-screen TVs. But
we recognize that these are little more than scams—a way to
increase the purchase price and boost the retailer’s revenue.
Further, we tolerate these scams because we can “just say no”—
caveat emptor and all that. But health care “reform” proposes
forcing us to turn over a larger portion of our income to insur-
ance companies—who will then do their best to guarantee that
the most expensive health care services we need will not be cov-
ered by the plan we are compelled to buy. Unlike a broken toaster
that can just be thrown out when the warranty fails to cover
repairs, we do not, and do not want to, throw out people whose
insurance coverage proves to be inadequate.
Above we noted that health care already absorbs more than
17 percent of GDP. It is worthwhile to step back and look at the
costs of providing health care payments through insurers.
According to Woolhandler (2007), 20 cents of every health care
dollar goes to insurance companies. Another 11 cents goes to
administrative overhead and profit of the health care providers.
Much of that is due to the paperwork required to try to get the
insurance companies to pay claims (there are 1,300 private insur-
ers, with nearly as many different forms that health care
providers must fill out to file a claim). It is estimated that $350
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States adopted a single-payer system (Taibbi 2009). Hence, it is
plausible that a full quarter of all U.S. health care spending results
from the peculiar way that we finance our health care system—
relying on insurance companies for a fundamentally uninsur-
able service. Getting insurance companies out of the loop might
conceivably “pay for” provision of health care services to all of
those who currently have inadequate access—including the
underinsured. However, none of the reforms being seriously con-
templated in Washington would do that; instead, they would
actually strengthen the insurers’ hand by forcing more people to
acquire (unaffordable) coverage. 
Note that we are not recanting what we said above: getting
rid of insurance would still leave America with a very expensive
system because of our “lifestyle choices.” We see definancializa-
tion as a rationalization of and an improvement to our system
that will also reduce costs. Still, we also believe that much must be
done in the way of improving our lifestyles that would not only
lower costs but also improve the quality of life. Indeed, we believe
that is probably more important than funneling everyone into the
insurance system, or removing them from the grasp of insurance
companies. However, we are faced with health care “reform” that
is focused on what we believe is the less important problem—
insurance—and realize that there is little political will to undertake
the more fundamental problem of our unhealthy lifestyles. Hence,
for now we would like to see a reduced role for private insurers, a
bigger role for government funding of health care, and—over the
longer run—greater public discussion of the “real” problems, such
as environmental and lifestyle factors, that help make ours by far
the most expensive health care system in the world.
In sum, using insurers to provide funding is a complex,
costly, and distorting method of financing health care. Imagine
sending your weekly grocery bill to an insurance clerk for review
and having the grocer reimbursed by the insurer to whom you
have been paying “food insurance” premiums—with some of
your purchases excluded from coverage at the whim of the
insurer. Is there any plausible reason for putting an insurance
agent between you and your grocer? No. Then why should an
insurer stand between you and your health care provider? 
Financialization and Health Care Reform
Clearly, extending health care insurance to all is not desirable,
nor will it reduce health care costs. But “insurance for all” also
represents yet another unwelcome intrusion of finance into every
part of our economy and our lives. In other words, the envi-
sioned “reforms” would simply complete the financialization of
health care that is already diverting resources into the same
financial sector that swallowed residential real estate. We have
previously written about the financialization of houses and 
commodities (Wray 2008) and the plan to financialize death
(Auerback and Wray 2009). (Michael Moore’s latest film,
Capitalism: A Love Story, even details the use of “peasant insur-
ance” as a means for employers to place bets on the death of
employees.) In these cases, Wall Street packages assets (home
mortgages, commodities futures, and life insurance policies) so
that gamblers can speculate on outcomes. Health insurance
works somewhat differently: the insurer sells you a policy and
then denies your claim due to a preexisting condition, or simply
because denial is more profitable and you probably don’t have
sufficient funding to fight your way through the courts anyway.
You then go bankrupt, and the FIRE sector (finance, insurance,
and real estate) takes your assets and garnishes your wages. 
So here is one rather extreme way of looking at health care
“reform” proposals. There is a huge untapped market of nearly 50
million people who are not paying insurance premiums. Solution?
“Reform” that requires everyone to turn over a portion of their
pay to insurers. Can’t afford the premiums? That’s okay—Uncle
Sam will kick in a few hundred billion to help out the insurers. Of
course, do not expect much more health care or better health out-
comes because these have little to do with “reform,” which is
instead directed toward delivering more premium-paying cus-
tomers to the FIRE sector. Viewed from this angle, “reform” is just
another timely bailout of the financial system, because the tens of
trillions of dollars already committed are not nearly enough to
keep it afloat.
Yes, that does sound extreme. You might wonder about the
connection between insurance and the financial sector. They are
two peas in a pod. This is because we threw out the New Deal
Glass-Steagall Act that separated commercial banking from
investment banking and insurance and replaced it with the
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999, which allowed Wall Street to
form bank holding companies to integrate the full range of
“financial services”—the companies that sold toxic mortgage
securities to your pension funds, created commodity futures
indexes for university endowments to drive up the price of your
petrol, and took bets on the deaths of firms, countries, and your
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Financialized—packaged and sold to gamblers making bets on
default. Even the weather and earthquakes can be financialized.
We’re not kidding: in the midaughts the U.N. World Food
Programme (WFP) proposed issuing “catastrophe bonds” linked
to low rainfall. The WFP would pay principal and interest when
rainfall was sufficient; if there were no rainfall, the WFP would
cease making payments on the bonds and would instead fund
relief efforts (Das 2006, 32). This winter, the unexpectedly cold
weather in December and January across much of the United
States and Europe has undoubtedly led to large (but as yet unre-
ported) losses on “weather insurance” purchased not only by
farmers but also by resorts and retailers whose profits are
impacted by bad weather. Earthquakes have also been financial-
ized: Tokyo Disneyland has issued bonds that do not have to be
repaid in the event of an earthquake. Traders talk about new
frontiers “trading in rights to clean air, water and access to fish-
ing grounds; basics of human life that I had always taken for
granted” (ibid., 320). The next bubble will probably be in car-
bon trading—the financialization of pollution! This time, actual
toxic waste will be packaged and sold to global savers. 
Is There a Policy Alternative?
Is there an alternative? Frankly, we don’t know. Leaving aside the
political problems—once the financial sector has got its hands on
some aspect of our lives it is very difficult to wrest back control—
health care is a very complex issue. It is clear that provision of
routine care should not be left to insurance companies. Perhaps
unforeseen and major expenses due to accidents might be insur-
able costs, with a “single payer” (that is, the federal government)
left to provide basic coverage for all of life’s normal health care
needs and individuals purchasing additional coverage as desired.
Basic coverage—for things like births, routine exams and screen-
ing, inoculations, hospice and elder care—can be de-insured. 
However, a significant portion of health care expenses is due
to chronic problems, some of which can be traced to birth. We
argued above that these are not really insurable—they are the pre-
existing conditions that insurers must exclude. Others can be
traced to lifestyle choices. Some employers are already charging
higher premiums to employees whose body mass index (BMI)
exceeds a chosen limit—with rebates provided to those who man-
age to lose weight. While we are skeptical that a monetary incen-
tive will be effective in changing behavior that is certainly quite
complex, this approach is probably better than excluding indi-
viduals from insurance simply because of an undesirable BMI.
Some observers have called for extending a Medicare-like
program to all (Fonkalsrud and Intriligator 2009). Although
sometimes called insurance, Medicare is not really an insurance
program. Rather, it pays for qualifying health care of qualified
individuals based on age and employment history. It is essen-
tially a universal-payer, pay-go system. Its revenues come from
taxes and “premiums” paid by covered individuals for a portion
of the program. We will not go into the details here, but “pay-
go” means it is not really advance funded. Many believe that
Medicare’s trust fund could be strengthened through the appli-
cation of higher taxes now, so that more benefits could be paid
later as America ages. Actually, Medicare spending today is 
covered by today’s government spending—and tomorrow’s
Medicare spending will be covered by tomorrow’s government
spending. At the national level, it is not possible to transport
today’s tax revenue to tomorrow to “pay for” future Medicare
spending (see Papadimitriou and Wray 1999).
This is a difficult concept. In real terms, however, it is sim-
pler to understand: Medicare is pay-go because the health care
services are provided today, to today’s seniors; there is no way to
stockpile medical services for future use (of course, some med-
ical machinery and hospitals can be built now to be used later,
but most medical services provided in the future will require
allocation of real resources at the time the service is provided).
And the true purpose of the Medicare taxes and premiums paid
today is to reduce net personal income, so that resources can be
diverted to the health care sector today. Many believe that sector
already has too many dedicated resources. If so, the solution can-
not be to raise taxes or premiums today in order to build a big-
ger trust fund that will offset financial burdens tomorrow. If we
find that 25 years from now we need more resources in the health
care sector, the best way to deal with that will be to spend more
on health care at that time, and to tax incomes at that time to
reduce consumption in other areas so that resources can be
shifted to health care at that time.
Our problem today is that we need to allocate more of
today’s health care services to the currently underserved, which
is comprised of two different sets of people: folks with no health
insurance, and those with health insurance that is too limited in
its coverage to provide the care they need. The reform legislation
proposed would provide a subsidy to get private insurers to expand
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current House bill are projected to reach $773 billion by 2019.)
If we take the example above of a person with diabetes who is
excluded because of his preexisting condition, the marginal sub-
sidy required for this patient if he is unable to pay for insurance
would have to equal the expected cost of care, plus a risk pre-
mium in case that estimate turns out to be too low, plus the
insurer’s costs of doing business, plus normal profits. If, how-
ever, diabetes care were directly covered by a federal government
payment to health care providers, the risk premium, insurance
business costs, and profits on the insurance business would not
be necessary. In other words, using the insurance system to pay
for the added costs of providing care to people with diabetes adds
several layers of costs. This makes no sense.
Given today’s political constraints, perhaps a full single-
payer option might not be feasible, but one earlier variant of the
Senate’s proposed health care legislation did feature a Medicare
buy-in. Congress could use Senate reconciliation and expand
Medicare via the Senate’s buy-in provisions (the House can
approve this on the basis of a simple majority vote). The
Congressional Budget Office has already signed off on this as a
means of saving money (“budget savings” is in some respects a
nonsensical concept, but it provides the necessary political cover
to deploy what is essentially a budgetary procedure). More impor-
tant, a Medicare buy-in would provide a genuine “public option”
that, by competing against private insurance companies, would
help control costs. It would also help solve the problem of preex-
isting conditions, since Medicare does not deny coverage on this
basis. As James K. Galbraith notes in The Predator State (2008),
Public health insurance entities such as Medicare do
not evaluate risk because they are universal. Therefore,
they save the major cost associated with private health
insurance. They pay their personnel at civil servant
salary scales and are under no obligation to provide a
return to shareholders via dividends or meet a target
rate of return. Insurance in general is therefore intrin-
sically a service that the public sector can competently
provide at lower cost than the private sector, and from
the standpoint of the entire population, selective pro-
vision of private health insurance is invariably inferior
to universal public provision. (158)
In other words, this brings us closer to the “ideal” low-cost
universal insurance plan discussed by Krugman and analyzed
above. Allowing a Medicare buy-in to Americans under age 65
would give people a genuine alternative to private health insurance
and thereby render the whole issue of denying coverage on the basis
of preexisting conditions moot. And it would substantially enhance
the global competitiveness of American corporations.
A Medicare buy-in would also have the added benefit of get-
ting us closer to a single-payer system, which is a far more
rational way to control health care costs, largely due to the
administrative complexity associated with our current patch-
work system and the corresponding inability to bargain with
suppliers, especially drug companies, for lower prices. Residents
of the United States notoriously pay much higher prices for pre-
scription drugs than residents of other advanced countries,
including Canada. This proposal would also give American
health care consumers far more bang for their buck than the cur-
rent legislation.
What is less appreciated is that both Medicaid and, to an
even larger extent, the Department of Veterans Affairs get drug
discounts from the pharmaceutical companies similar to or
greater than those received by the Canadian health care system.
Another little-known secret of the Obama health care proposals
is that they would have placed considerable restrictions on the
importation of generic drugs from other countries as part of the
deal to get Big Pharma on board (Heavey 2009). This is a mistake.
Conclusions
It will be clear by now that a magic bullet doesn’t exist. We face
three serious and complex issues that can be separately analyzed.
First, we need a system that provides health care services. Our
current health care system does a tolerably good job for most
people, although a large portion of the population does not
receive adequate preventative and routine care, and thus is forced
to rely on expensive emergency treatment. The solution to that
is fairly obvious and easy to implement—if we leave payment to
the side: we need to guarantee that all Americans have access to
preventative and routine care. The problem, clearly, is not that we
do not have sufficient resources to do this. We might choose to
use markets or increased public provision to ensure those
resources are available where they are most needed. We must also
recognize that a big part of America’s health expenses is due to
chronic and avoidable conditions that result from the corpora-
tization of food—a more difficult problem to resolve, and one
that surely requires more leadership from government.Public Policy Brief, No. 110 18
Second, and conversely, our system might provide in the
aggregate too many resources for the provision of health care
(leaving other needs of our population unmet). Rational discus-
sion, followed by rational allocation, can deal with that. We don’t
need “death panels” (which we already have—run by the insur-
ance companies), but we do need rational allocation. We sup-
pose that health care professionals could do a far better job than
the FIRE sector would ever do in deciding how much care and
what type of care should be provided. Individuals who would
like more care than professionals decide to be in the public inter-
est could always pay for it out of pocket, or they could purchase
private insurance. Maybe the cost of Botox treatments is an
insurable expense? Obviously, what is deemed to be necessary
health care will evolve over time—it, like human rights, is “aspi-
rational”—and someday might include nose jobs and tummy
tucks for everyone. But meantime, it makes sense for govern-
ment to play some role in promoting sensible discussion about
the portion of our nation’s total production that ought to be
devoted to health care—and what kinds of health care uses of
those resources ought to have top priority.
Third, we need a way to pay for health care services. For rou-
tine care and for preexisting conditions, the only logical conclu-
sion is that the best risk pool is one that encompasses the
population as a whole. It is in the public interest to see that the
entire population receives routine care. It is also in the public
interest to see that our little bundles of preexisting conditions—
otherwise known as infants—get the care they need. We cannot
see any obvious advantage to involving private insurance in the
payment system for this kind of care. If we decided to have more
than one insurer, we would have to be sure that each had the
same risks so that the respective premiums would be compara-
ble, which would allow the general population to choose between
them; hence, the same sort of insured pool. It is conceivable that
competition among private insurers could drive down premiums,
but it is more likely that competition would instead take the form
of excluding as many claims as possible. We’d thus get high pre-
miums and lots of exclusions—exactly what we’ve got now.
We could instead have a single national private insurer pur-
suing the normal monopoly pricing and poor service strategy
(remember those good old days when you could choose from
among one single telephone service provider?), but in that case
we would have to regulate the premiums as well as the rejection
of claims. Regulation of premiums cannot be undertaken with-
out the regulation of the health care costs that the insurer(s)
would have to cover. If we are going to go to all the trouble of
regulating premiums, claim rejections, and health care prices, we
might as well go whole hog and have the federal government pay
the costs. Difficult and contentious, yes. Impossible? No—we can
look to our fellow developed nations for examples, and to our
own Medicare system.
Finally, there may still be a role for private insurers, albeit a
substantially downsized one. Private insurance can be reserved
for accidents, with individuals grouped according to similar risks:
hang gliders, smokers, and texting drivers can all be sorted into
risk classes for insurance purposes. If it is any consolation to the
downsized insurers, we also need to downsize the role played by
the whole financial sector. Finance won’t like that, because it has
become accustomed to its outsize role. In recent years it has been
taking 40 percent of corporate profits. It takes most of its share
off the top—fees and premiums that it receives before anyone
else gets paid. Rather than playing an auxiliary role, helping to
ensure that goods and services get produced and distributed to
those who need them, the FIRE sector has come to see its role as
primary, with all aspects of our economy run by the tail that wags
the dog. As John Kenneth Galbraith’s The Great Crash (1955)
shows, that was exactly the situation our country faced in the late
1920s. It took the Great Depression to put finance back into its
proper place. The question is whether we can get it into the back-
seat without the consequence of an equally deep and prolonged
depression. 
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